The paper critically examines the dominant neoclassical views on the adoption of mandatory Fully Funded (FF) pension schemes as a partial or complete substitute for the unfunded Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) type. According to this view, such a transition will have the positive real effect of endowing future generations with higher capital and output per head, since it should cause a once and for all increase in aggregate saving and the capital stock. This would prepare the economy for future demographic developments. We examine three obstacles to such a claim. To begin with, the reform may fail to boost workers' marginal propensity to save, since workers may contract their voluntary saving to compensate for the larger mandatory saving to FF schemes. Second, if PAYG's payroll contributions are reduced and diverted to Pension Funds, the larger private saving supply will be balanced by lower government saving, if the government is committed to honouring the current pension payments. Third, Keynes's saving paradox, reinforced by the capital theory critique inspired by Sraffa, shows that the rise in the marginal propensity to save does not result in an increase in capital accumulation, but rather in a fall in income and employment.
Introduction
In a famous paper Samuelson (1958, p. 468) envisaged capital accumulation as a way to 'trade with Mother Nature current consumption goods in return for future consumption goods'. Samuelson made explicit reference to neoclassical capital theory. At the same time, writing in a Keynesian age, Samuelson did not regard Pay-as-you-go programmes (PAYG) as detrimental to capital accumulation, nowadays a common criticism. Later, well into the monetarist offensive, Feldstein (1974) criticised PAYG arguing that '[b] ecause social security contributions are used to pay concurrent benefits, the capital stock is smaller and income is less ' (ibid. p. 923) . This paper will examine critically mainstream views of the adoption of mandatory Fully Funded (FF) pension schemes as a partial or complete substitute for unfunded PAYG ones, focusing in particular on the role played by neoclassical capital theory in the proposed transition.
It is useful to recall here a distinction put forward by Feldstein (1976) between 'tax design' and 'tax reform'. According to this classification, 'design is a guide for . . . policy . . . in the ''original position '' ' (ibid., p. 77, original italics) . By original position we mean here an imaginary economy without any pension scheme. However, even if a formal pension scheme is not in place, for the simple reason that there are old people around, nonmandatory old-age provision must exist, through private saving policies, family transfers or charitable donations. In this regard, Feldstein's classification suggests that a 'reform must take as its starting point the existing . . . system' (ibid., original italics). The reform context is the most realistic, since it is related to economies that have to decide whether to move from an existing pension scheme to a different one, for instance from PAYG to FF. In this case, it will not be enough to make a judgement on the basis of the relative benefits of PAYG and FF schemes-as is usually done by comparing the respective rates of returns as if we were in a design context-since the costs and macroeconomic implications of moving from one arrangement to another have to be taken into account.
According to dominant opinion, the initial introduction of PAYG rather than an FF scheme in most industrialised countries is the equivalent to original sin. The fault can be remedied only if one or more generations reduce their consumption in order to compensate for previous profligacy. This would reverse 'the initial intergenerational redistribution, shifting income back from the current to the future generations' (Holzmann, 1998, p. 3) . Unfortunately, no one wants to be that current generation. Even accepting the mainstream argument about the desirability of an FF scheme, there is a cost in terms of transition between the two systems.
Ideally, according to conventional theory, a successfully created mandatory FF scheme would permit an enduring solution to the old-age risk to be achieved by increasing the accumulation of savings by those who are already saving to prepare for the old-age risk and by increasing the number of workers that save for this purpose. This would lead, given the labour supply, to a higher per capita capital endowment and output, preparing the economy to deal with the forthcoming demographic developments (lower fertility and higher longevity). We consider therefore as a test for a successful reform a rise in aggregate saving and investment, which we shall define as the 'saving test'. This paper examines three obstacles to the FF reform. The first difficulty is fully recognised by the mainstream literature: the reform may fail to raise workers' marginal propensity to save, since they may contract their voluntary saving to make up for the larger mandatory saving. This is particularly true if workers already save for the old-age (life-cycle) motive and contribute to a PAYG scheme. Second, if in a reform context PAYG's payroll contributions are reduced and diverted to an FF scheme-so that workers have less incentive to contract their voluntary saving-the larger private saving supply will, however, be offset exactly by lower government saving, if the government is committed to honouring the current pension payments. Third, even if workers accept the double burden of paying extra payroll contributions to an FF scheme-without a reduction in voluntary saving and PAYG contributions-Keynes's paradox of thrift and the capital theory critique inspired by Sraffa suggest that, in both closed and open economies, the effect of the rise in the marginal propensity to save is not an increase in capital accumulation, but rather a fall in both income and employment. If this happens, the FF reform will not only fail to increase national saving, but will also undermine the financial balance of PAYG, which hinges upon the amount of aggregate wage income.
1 An additional paradox is that the resulting PAYG deficit will be financed by the newly created, and in this respect unfunded, pension funds (PFs).
Fully Funded schemes and capital theory
An FF scheme is an old-age pension scheme-generally, but not necessarily, privatethat accumulates reserves invested in private assets representative of the private capital stock. Old-age insurance comprises two aspects: the first is not distinguishable from a saving plan, while the second belongs to the insurance domain.
2 In the present paper, we are mainly concerned with the first aspect, in the analysis of which capital theory is involved. If we assume that the old all have the same survival rate, the old-age risksharing side of an FF scheme can indeed be neglected.
An FF scheme works as a sort of 'relay race' between generations in which real reserves held by the elderly through the PFs are the baton that the old generation sells to the young to obtain part of the social product. Suppose a stationary economy with two overlapping generations made up of N homogeneous workers and N retirees. The active generation saves S w for the old-age motive out of the wage bill (W ¼ wN), and consumes the rest (C w ). The old sell to the workers the capital assets K that they acquired when active and consume (C o ) the proceeds plus the rate of return yield on the assets (for the sake of simplicity they do not save). In this simple economy net national income is Y ¼ W þ rK and
Our test of a pension reform aimed at the creation of an FF scheme is therefore whether or not it leads to the formation of an additional stock of capital and corresponding financial reserves. According to neoclassical principles, the capital stock rises if there is an increase in the community's saving supply out of full-employment (or natural) income, that is if National Saving (S N ) increases. Reasoning in neoclassical terms, we have thus to explore in which cases one may expect an FF reform to lead to a higher full-employment saving rate in economies in which discretionary or compulsory pension schemes are already in place. Let us note, however, that from a Keynesian point of view the level of investment is independent of the level of saving and, therefore, is not affected by any reform aimed at raising the marginal propensity to save, even if successful in attaining this result. For the sake of argument, let us temporarily abandon the Keynesian stance and explore the consistency of the conventional reasoning. In this spirit, as a preliminary step, we shall now examine the marginalist roots of the dominant approach, linking the conventional view of FF schemes to marginal capital theory.
Mainstream economists explain the investment decisions that in the past gave rise to the existing capital stock in terms of marginalist principles, according to which gross investments are dependent on saving. When dealing with an FF scheme, these economists have two models in mind. On the saving supply side the reference model is Modigliani's life-cycle model, which is an elaboration of Keynes's 'foresight' motive of saving decisions (Keynes, 1936, pp. 107-8) . On the saving demand side, the reference point is the marginalist causal relationship between saving and investment, clearly expounded, for instance, by Knut Wicksell (1934) and employed by Solow (1970) in the so-called 'neoclassical growth model'.
The capital stock, heterogeneous in nature, must of course be measured according to some homogeneous standard. According to the marginalist approach, all physical capital goods have the same economic origin precisely in the amount of consumption goods the enjoyment of which individuals decide to postpone to the future. This is the conception that the supporters of FF schemes refer to: by selling the assets they possess to the fully employed young, the old (also previously fully employed) are able to recover the consumption goods 'crystallised' in the capital stock, while the constancy of this 'consumption fund' is assured by the renewed abstention from consumption of the workers. In a stationary economy, the dissaving of the old is matched exactly by the saving of the workers, so that the amount of consumption goods 'incorporated' in the capital stock remains constant. In this setting, the PFs just act as buffers between overlapping generations. The marginalist principles ensure that, for a given labour supply, substitution among consumption goods or among productive factors (e.g., Solow, 1970, pp. 15-16) transforms agents' saving decisions into an increase in the average per-worker capital endowment. It is important to note that, ceteris paribus, the rise in the capital-labour coefficient takes place only in the take-off phase of the PFs, that is when there are net saving decisions in the economy. Once a new regime is established, with a stationary population or in a steadily growing economy, the saving decisions of the young are matched, on average, by the dissaving decisions of the old, in the above-mentioned relay race in which the stock of capital assets held by the PFs is the baton.
According to conventional economic theory, a fully successful reform would thus advantage both the current standard of living by raising the per-capita capital endowment and output, and prepare the economy for possible demographic shocks. In an FF scheme retirees are indeed endowed with real reserves, that is with financial assets representative of the capital stock. Should there be fewer workers in future generations this capital stock may be used once again to increase the capital-labour ratio, or it may be given back in liquid form to the old by not replacing the now unwanted capital goods and returning the amortisation quotas to them.
1 In the case of increasing longevity, the use of the real reserves can be distributed over the longer survival period (the resulting lower expected annuities may also stimulate an endogenous rise in the propensity to save or later retirement in order to accumulate more saving).
FF reform and the saving rate
In mainstream discussions of pension policy it is generally assumed that the economy is operating under full-employment conditions (or at some 'natural' rate of unemployment). This is tantamount to assuming that any saving supply out of full employment income translates into investment, a key assumption for the neoclassical view of pension reform. While this is taken for granted, another preliminary question is instead openly faced by conventional economists, that is, whether FF reform does lead to an higher saving supply (a good introduction is Engen and Gale, 1997; cf., also Journal of Economic Perspective, Fall 1996; World Bank, 1994 , Issue Brief 4 for a summing up). In this debate the impact of FF reform on private saving hinges upon households' saving motives.
First, suppose an economy in which workers do not save and the old are supported by personal (family) transfers (assume for simplicity that all have the same number of offspring), that is
This may be the case of workers with little foresight, so that mandatory saving to FF schemes may force them to save and add to national saving. The problem is that non-saver workers may behave this way not because they lack foresight, but because they are too poor to save, for instance in developing countries-and it is difficult to force them to reduce their low standard of living (including that of their parents). Next, let us suppose that wages are above a subsistence level and that workers solve the old-age problem through voluntary (discretionary) saving plans. The old-age saving model is similar to that in Section 1. We just rewrite the first equation as . So, in the worst (but still possible) total-displacement case, after the reform only the management of the capital assets has changed-say from mutual funds to PFs-but not their total amount (World Bank, 1994, p. 308). 2 In the instance of mainly bequest-motivated saving, the case looks more favourable to a positive effect of an FF reform on the marginal propensity to save and on aggregate saving, if, motivated by altruism or vanity, individuals increase their foresight saving 1 If forced to save, workers may react by demanding higher real wages. If successful, the change in income distribution would negatively affect the capitalist class's saving supply out of profits. The supply of workers' foresight savings is increased, but S N is less affected. It may also happen that the State, on the one hand, imposes S w ¼C o saving on the workers (that is, it diverts their family transfers to the PFs) and, on the other hand, it takes over the support of the old. However, if the government, in order to finance C o , (a) taxes profits, saving out of profits may fall, reducing the net impact of the reform on S N ; (b) alternatively, if it issues public debt, the new workers' S w will finance government negative saving, and again the net impact on S N is nil (cf., Section 3).
2 The likelihood of this case is increased by the little-noted fact that a mandatory old-age scheme, being based on risk-sharing between people with different survival expectations, requires less saving accumulation to achieve the same old-age consumption target. In other words, under voluntary schemes, far-sighted subjects who want to obtain a target consumption whatever their survival in retirement will tend to save in excess of what would be required to obtain that target if the amount of necessary saving were determined according to the average number of periods of expected survival. With a mandatory scheme, workers can achieve the same result more efficiently without that excess saving.
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without decreasing their bequest saving. Pure bequest-motivated saving behaviour may, however, be characteristic of wealthier families more specifically (Modigliani, 1988, p. 38) , i.e., those less involved in Social Security (Soc.Sec.) reforms.
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We are thus left in a vicious circle: if workers are already saving, mandatory saving will possibly displace voluntary saving. If they do not save, they are probably too poor to be forced to save. In synthesis, the private saving propensity cannot be managed at will through an FF pension reform, and its effects are largely uncertain (Poterba, 1997, pp. 143-4) . It can be concluded that the success of FF reform designed to increase private parsimony rests on the existence of workers wealthy enough to save, but shortsighted, so that they did not save for the foresight motive before the reform. Musgrave (1981, p. 123) considered this as the most likely case, but-he concluded-'the issue is an empirical one' (cf., also Hughes, 2000) .
These discouraging results are even more likely in an economy with PAYG in which
tr are the pay-roll taxes associated with PAYG transfers. Since workers are already contributing to PAYG pensions (and perhaps saving from the old-age motive), it is even more likely that the imposition of an additional DS 2 Only a cut in expected PAYG pensions might discourage workers from reducing S vol w .
3
As an alternative, mainstream economists argue that a reform aimed at realising a Soc.Sec. surplus and increasing government saving (S G ) would more likely bring about the desired rise in S N (Poterba, 1997, pp. 144-6) . 4 The reader should appreciate the fact 1 The importance of the bequest motive vis-à-vis the life-cycle hypothesis is defended by Kotlikoff in a symposium with Modigliani in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (vol. 2, 1988) . In abstract, especially among low income households, intergenerational wealth transfer might hide an old-age motive: bequest in exchange of old-age support or 'uncertainty about the length of life' (ibid., p. 39). This may suggest that a reduction in bequest-motivated saving may offset a higher old-age mandatory saving.
2 As before, if DT hits only profits, it is likely that saving out of profits will be negatively affected. In this case, DS mand w is financed out of profits and an FF scheme created, but the reform cannot be said to be fully successful in terms of increasing S N . 3 For instance Feldstein and Liebman (2001, pp. 58-9) argue that, since the additional mandatory saving will, ceteris paribus, increase the future old-age income, then the trick is to cut the PAYG pension in order to maintain the expected old-age income unchanged. As a result, 'rational life cycle savers would have no reason to reduce their direct discretionary saving in response to a mandatory saving program'.
4 S G can of course also be increased by an 'on-budget' surplus. But, as Cutler (1999, p. 128 ) noted, the achievement of a Soc.Sec. (off-budget) surplus is facilitated by the public alarm created around pensions. In the US debate, this kind of surplus is said to increase the 'funding status' of Soc.Sec. The surplus obtained after the 1983 Soc.Sec. reform has been used for the accumulation of a 'Trust Fund'. Given the on-budget balance, the Soc.Sec. off-budget surplus, even if held in Treasury bonds, would increase S G and, according to conventional theory, crowd in private investment. Alternatively, the surplus might be directly invested in private capital assets (for a critical review of the debate, see Wray, 1990-91; Cesaratto, 2002 (Barro, 1974) . Poterba (1997, p. 146) concludes that, 'on balance', one should expect larger Soc.Sec. funding to lead to higher S N , given the myopic behaviour of lower income families with respect to private old-age saving. But, 'on balance', we remain puzzled, and somewhat pessimistic, about the impact of FF reforms on S N . Be that as it may, in the final section, Keynes's saving paradox will show that, even if the result is to some degree favourable to the mainstream aspiration, the potential increase in S N will be frustrated by the lack of reaction on the investment side.
Transition plans in disarray
In spite of a persistent alarmist campaign concerning the financial sustainability of PAYG-an alarm that should not be too readily confused with a substantial difficulty, for instance, a real threat to the survival of the economy (cf., e.g., Papadimitriou and Wray, 1999, p. 11; Cesaratto, 2005A, ch. 8) , neither cuts in benefits nor increased payroll taxes have become popular measures. So, can a painless transition to an FF scheme be designed that realises the objective of increasing S w and S N ? Probably, the idea that payroll tax could be reduced so as to enable workers to divert the saved income to the FF scheme, existing pension promises being maintained by financing them through the public purse while, at the same time, creating a genuine FF scheme, still has some currency among politicians, pundits and even pension experts. Indeed, this idea was actually applied in some Latin American and Eastern European pension reforms, and is periodically resuscitated (for instance by the World Bank, 2001; Myles and Pierson, 2001, p. 313 , that is, it is exactly matched by the rise in mandatory savings. In effect, the mandatory contributions to PFs are used to buy the government bonds (often called 'recognition bonds') issued to finance the Soc.Sec. deficit. Government savings S G have fallen by
1 What we get is a sort of privatised PAYG system-a 'narrow prefunded scheme' in Orszag and Stiglitz's parlance (2001, p. 22) -that is financed not through contributions but by issuing public debt. This is bought up by PFs that collect the mandatory savings of workers.
2 In a growing economy in which the wage bill and contributions grow at the rate g (roughly the summation of the rates of growth of wages and employment, respectively), past 1 The fact that S N has not risen should not surprise the neoclassical reformers, given that neither C w nor C o (¼T tr ) has fallen as they should if the economy is assumed to be at full employment. 2 The distinction between genuine (funded) and false (unfunded) FF schemes was well known before Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) and others popularised it. See, for instance, de Finetti, 1956, p. 279; Thompson, 1983 Thompson, , p. 1445 Transition to fully funded pension schemes 39
contributions obtain a 'rate of return' equal to g. Similarly, in a 'narrow prefunded scheme' an interest rate equal to g on the recognition bonds is permitted by the rate of growth of the contribution base (now channelled into the PFs). In this case, the reform only transforms the pension promises-often called 'hidden pension debt', see below (v)-into explicit debt, but since its growth is equal to that of the contribution flow, there is no additional debt for the government (the explicit debt is exactly equal to that implicit in traditional PAYG). It should perhaps be added that, of course, PFs have thus been created that, in a sense, collect workers' foresight saving. However, S N has not increased and behind the higher 'foresight' financial wealth held by the workers, there is public debt, not private capital assets (i.e., the real reserves that constitute a genuine FF scheme). World Bank experts recognise that this type of reform strategy 'does not change the overall level of debt nor the net asset-position of government; it only reduces the amount of implicit debt made explicit' (Holzmann, 1998, p. 10; cf., also James, 2001, p. 64) . However, they insist on considering this as a 'partial shift towards a funded system' (Holzmann, p. 10, original italics), which it is not.
Clearly, privatised PAYGs are nothing but a more costly version of the traditional PAYG scheme: a poor result for pension reformers. It has been pointed out increasingly in the mainstream literature that this is precisely the 'ground breaking' kind of reform that has taken place in Chile (and in other countries). In Chile, only the existence of a government surplus realised in the years of the pension reform by cuts in non-pension public spending G prevented the reform from leading to an increase in the (explicit) public deficit (which it did in Argentina, cf., Bertranou et al., 2003, p. 107) .
1 Although the Chilean reform is often associated with robust capital accumulation, this is better explained along Keynesian lines by export-led growth (Agosin, 2001; Ffrench-Davis, 2002) . One of the academic champions of the Chilean pension reform candidly admits that this kind of changewhich he calls 'apparent funding' or 'neutral relabelling' of a PAYG scheme-does not 'attempt to increase national saving' (Valdés- Prieto, 1997, p. 191) . So, further laborious arguments have been made to justify this 'neutral relabelling' experiment. Five of these arguments can be listed.
(i) The first argument is related to the political 'insulation' of the pension system from the political process once government bonds guarantee pension rights (Valdés-Prieto, 1997; p. 201; Diamond, 1996) . From an economic viewpoint, this claim sounds self-contradictory, given that a privatised PAYG cannot but suffer from the same troubles as a traditional PAYG, and the mere fact that the pension promises are being held in government bonds does not guarantee anything to pensioners. In the event of Government debt default, the solvency of such pension schemes in countries that adopt them depends, as much as traditional PAYG does, on the economic capability and political will to maintain its promises. Bertranou et al. (2003, pp. 109-10) provide a balanced assessment of the Argentina experience after the default of December 2001. At the end of 2001, 70% of Argentinean assets administered by PFs were held in public securities. The value of these funds was converted into pesos after the crises, which meant the loss of 60-70% of their dollar value at the end of 2002. However, with regard to the PFs, the government avoided the default that occurred to the detriment of other creditors, assuring also the continuity of interest payments and repayments. So, evaluating their performance in real domestic value, the authors conclude that 'the institutional and financial framework of the capitalisation scheme has protected its members during the crises, limiting the damage to assets . . . although it is obvious that it does not provide cast-iron protection and keeps the system completely isolated' (ibid., p. 110). Notably, institutions eventually accorded the same safeguard to the public scheme (genuine PAYG). This saw benefits initially reduced (in peso terms) by 13% from the mid-2001, but later the courts ordered the government to withdraw the measure.
(ii) It might be argued that, as a result of a privatised PAYG, workers, in addition to perfect 'actuarial equity', would get a rate of return r on their recognition bonds that is higher than the notional one obtained by the traditional PAYG (that is, r>g). The question is, who is called upon to pay for this higher return? If, once the system is fully under way, the cost to the public purse is met by increasing the taxation on the same workers, the net advantage would be nil (Geanakoplos et al., 1998, pp. 14-17) . If progressive taxation involved other social groups, there would be a favourable net effect for workers. But this increase in benefits vis-à-vis past contributions could just as well be obtained under the traditional PAYG without incurring the higher managerial costs of the privatised PAYG. The World Bank experts recognise indeed that if the rate of interest on the recognition bonds is greater than the growth rate of the wage bill, the privatisation of PAYG can be accompanied, if financed by public debt, by a 'true transition deficit' (Holzmann, 1998 , p. 14, original italics) which does not arise in the case in which the recognition bonds only obtained the rate g.
(iii) According to the prevailing view, PAYG has negative externalities on the labour and financial markets (e.g., ibid., p. 23) that a privatised PAYG would help to fix. With regard to the labour market, a privatised PAYG is considered to show positive externalities on the labour supply as a consequence of the greater actuarial equity of the new scheme that rigorously links expected benefits to past payroll contributions. Provisionally leaving aside the confidence that these authors have in the neoclassical mechanisms whereby an increase in labour supply would be followed by a rise in employment, the empirical literature (often mainstream) seems to disprove both the idea of a labour supply function that is highly elastic to real wages, especially with regard to low income workers, and the relevance of the reform as an incentive for informal workers to join the formal labour market. The results of the 1994 Argentinean reform, for instance, disprove the expected growth of a more formal labour market (Rofman, 2000, pp. 18-20; Bertranou et al., 2003, p. 107) . Moreover, actuarial equity might be much more conveniently obtained through the so-called Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) reforms of PAYG without the need for a privatisation (on these reforms, cf., Cesaratto, 2005B).
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With regard to financial markets, the fact that very many payroll taxes are managed by the financial sector would, it is repeatedly asserted, make it 'deeper, more liquid, and more competitive' (Holzmann, 1998, p. 25) . This is probably seen as the result of economies of scale and the learning-by-doing gains that result from the larger financial stock and flows that the sector has to administer. The higher efficiency, so the argument goes, would boost investment and growth. These efficiency effects on financial markets are not a mechanical outcome and not sufficiently likely to support the case for a costly privatisation of PAYG. Moreover, they might not even be indispensable, since rapid economic growth has taken place in many countries, including Italy, Germany, Japan and most Asian Tigers, in spite of the underdevelopment, by Anglo-Saxon standards, of their financial markets (and probably helped by that underdevelopment and by State dirigisme in the financial sector). 1 (iv) The fourth argument concerns the diversification of the assets held by the PFs, which only at the beginning have to be public bonds, but which can later be traded for private or international assets in order to raise the rate of return: the 'unfunded' schemes become 'diversified' funds. On the face of it, however, in a closed economy, this diversification may just lead to a reshuffling of portfolios, whereby PFs will hold fewer Treasury bonds and more private assets, and the opposite as far as the other private or institutional funds are concerned. According to some mainstream economists, the reshuffling may lead to a redistribution of financial income and, given the money supply, to an unwelcome rise in the interest rates on public bonds (e.g., Diamond, 1996, pp. 72-3; Gale, 1997, pp. 74-5; Holzmann, 1998, p. 26; World Bank, 2001, p. 6; also Palley, 1998, p. 107 endorses this argument, but many Post-Keynesian economists tend to believe that the Central Bank would retain the capacity to determine the interest rate despite this reshuffling).
There has been some convoluted debate concerning the existence of a net positive effect of this kind of reshuffling on the saving supply. The debate has not actually been concerned only with PF diversification in private securities, but also with the proposal that the US Soc.Sec. Trust Fund should diversify in the private capital market.
2 But for our purposes the question is the same: the effects of a diversification of the assets held by an institution-private PFs or a Government Trust Fund-from government bonds towards private assets. In this regard, Diamond and Geanakoplos (1999, p. 1) and Orszag and Stiglitz (2001, pp. 29-30) both quote Alan Greenspan who, in a speech delivered in 1996, suggested the absence of clear macroeconomic effects of such portfolio reshuffling. Against this position, two laborious justifications for diversification have been put forward in a report edited by Diamond (1999) . According to this author, although diversification is 'initially an ''asset swap''', the 'post-reshuffling' higher returns on investing in private securities within Soc.Sec. or PFs will certainly be saved and accumulated, while this might not have been the 'pre-reshuffling' case when the higher returns accrued to individual investors (ibid., p. 56). However, some savers may reduce their voluntary saving as a consequence of the forced accumulation (ibid.). The second effect, endorsed also by Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) , relies on the existence of households that do not invest in the capital market. If Soc.Sec. forces them to do this, there is 'a possible improvement in risk bearing in the economy as a consequence of having more people share in the risky returns . . . The economy would be likely to respond in a way that increased future expected output because of the change in the mix of investment in response to a lower risk premium' (Diamond, 1999, p. 55 and 57) . Admittedly, however, 'such a response . . . is difficult to predict'. On balance, these 'are smaller effects for the economy as a whole than would be the effects of new investment resulting from decreased consumption' (ibid., p. 57), that is those obtained from an FF reform that was directly successful in raising the saving rate.
(v) One final goal of this kind of reform is to disclose the so-called hidden pension debt. As Mitchell and Zeldes (1996, p. 366) put it: 'privatisation would dramatically increase the measured fiscal deficit. Furthermore, issuing recognition bonds would increase measured government debt. These factors could induce politicians to cut G or raise taxes [ . . . ]'. The World Bank officially endorses this perspective:
Debt finance simply exchanges the old implicit debt and interest payments for new explicit debt and interest payments. Property rights in the debt are solidified, and market interest rates must be paid. This method of handling the debt does not require current generations to reduce their lifetime consumption, but neither boosts future saving nor growth, so future generations derive no benefit. Much of the demand for the new bond issues will come from the new PFs, which are rapidly accumulating savings that have to be invested somewhere. But a new bond issue may be politically difficult in countries that already have a large deficit. People would suddenly become aware of how enormous the social security debt is. The transition would treble the size of the explicit debt in most . . . countries. Although the change from implicit to explicit debt should have no macroeconomic impact in a country with fully informed citizens, it might change government budgetary behavior in the more realistic case in which the change provides new information to policymakers and citizens. (World Bank, 1994, pp. 267-9) The same strategy has been recently advocated also by Valdés-Prieto (2001, p. 80-1) . This stance may be part of what we may define, after Caffè (1972) , as the 'strategy of economic alarm' aimed apparently at alerting, but in practice at disquieting, public opinion-justifying cuts both in PAYG pensions and in other social spending. In a similar direction Palley (1998, pp. 106-7) denounces that cuts in government spending are the real objective of pension reforms: 'the debate over privatisation of social security may really be a Trojan horse, the real purpose of which is to starve government of revenue'.
Modigliani's and Feldstein's transition plans and the saving paradox
Modigliani and Feldstein (and respective associates) present 'transition models' based on a successful raising of the marginal propensity to save that they claim would allow a smooth changeover from PAYG to an FF scheme. With reference to the American experience, they propose to raise payroll taxes ('double burdening') in order to obtain a Soc.Sec. surplus. To avoid workers correspondingly contracting their voluntary saving, the expected PAYG pensions would be lowered so to maintain the expected old-age benefit unchanged (but later contributions to PAYG will be also lowered, as we shall shortly see). This surplus could then be placed in individual accounts managed by private (or public) PFs that invest in private assets, or alternatively, directly managed by the Soc.Sec. 'Trust Fund'. Most mainstream American economists endorse similar plans. A reform based on a double charge was adopted by Canada in 1997 (Myles and Pierson, 2001, p. 319) . Both Feldstein and Modigliani (cf., e.g., Feldstein and Samwick, 1998; Feldstein and Liebman, 2001, pp. 77; Modigliani et al., 1999) go further, perceiving the opportunity for a slow but progressive substitution of PAYG with an FF scheme. The goal of this kind of reform is to obtain from the FF scheme a level of real pension benefits equal to those obtained from existing PAYG but at a much lower contribution rate. They rely on the continuous reinvestment of the interest accruing on financial investment that, through the power of compound interest, will transform relatively small contributions into a much greater final capital (see Cesaratto, 2002 , for a simple example). This class of transition plan brings us back to the central, controversial issue of the link between saving and investment.
The thesis that additional saving will help more effectively to solve the problems of an ageing society crucially relies on the neoclassical proposition according to which a rise in the saving rate leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher investment rate owing to the adoption of more capital intensive techniques.
In Chapter 16 of his General Theory, Keynes (1936, pp. 83-4, 211) long ago warned us not to confuse the desire by some individuals to hold more financial wealth with an increase in the capital stock. This desire, by affecting effective demand and employment negatively, may well decrease the income of other individuals and their saving supply. The net result is that aggregate financial wealth and its real counterpart, capital stock, are unaffected.
Hicks, Modigliani and others tried to circumscribe Keynes's criticism of the conventional theory soon after the publication of The General Theory. Garegnani (1983) suggested that the results of the capital theory controversy (see the Quarterly Journal of Economics Symposium, 1966) provoked by Sraffa (1960) , could fortify the Keynesian principle of the independence of investment from saving, although there is no unanimity among nonconventional economists about this suggestion. Be that as it may, with regard to the FF reforms, fundamentally based on the neoclassical idea that a higher propensity to save would lead to a higher per capita capital endowment and output, Sraffa's contribution seems particularly pertinent. Indeed, what Sraffa and the subsequent controversy have ultimately shown is that it is not in general theoretically true that a fall in the rate of interest is followed by the adoption by entrepreneurs of more 'capital intensive' techniques (Garegnani, 1990) . The controversy focused upon the peculiar nature of 'capital', which is not a factor of production measurable in some conventional unit independent of distribution-like labour and land, which are measurable in physical units-but consists of commodities measurable only in terms of 'value'. This fact has dramatic consequences with regard to the neoclassical predictions about the direction of factor substitution once the factors' relative prices change. That means that, contrary to the claims of neoclassical theory, there is no reason why an increase in the saving rate should be followed by an increase in investment. On the contrary, 'the decisions to save and the corresponding additional future consumption will not materialise for the community in a competitive market' (Garegnani, unpublished, §32) . This is the same conclusion reached by Keynes, although by a different route.
The criticism of the neoclassical view of the saving-investment relation is the ultimate challenge to the dominant view of pensions reform.
1 Not only is it difficult for policymakers to raise the marginal propensity to save, as pointed out in Sections 2 and 3, but even if they were successful, the effects on investment might well be disappointing and the reform prove abortive. In addition, the lower marginal propensity to consume will bring about a fall in effective demand and employment. It is true that PFs are created for those workers that have luckily maintained their jobs (they save more, compensating the fall in the saving supply from the newly unemployed), but this is hardly a successful FF reform. Ironically, the only certain 'success' is a weakening of the employment base of PAYG (Palley, 1998, pp. 99-102; Cesaratto 2002). 2 In this regard, an additional paradox has been pointed out by Josef Steindl, who suggested that a fall in the marginal propensity to consume resulting from the successful attempt to create an FF scheme would only depress the national product, 'and in this way
[produce] the budget deficits which [are] indirectly financed by the pension funds' (Steindl, 1990, p. 175) . (See below for a simple example of this. 1 ) Steindl's paradox shows that although an abortive FF reform, which fails to raise national saving, may lead to the creation of PFs, these are at least partially 'unfunded ' as much as the schemes in Section 3.
Finally, the criticism of neoclassical capital theory also disposes of the conventional idea that a higher savings supply from the northern countries will naturally flow to the capitalpoor southern countries, stimulating investment there (e.g., Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) . On the contrary, from a Keynesian point of view, it is an investment decision in the southern regions (or autonomous consumption or public spending decisions), independent of any saving decisions in the north, that, by raising imports from the northern regions, generates higher output and saving in the north. Ex post, this saving will appear as a surplus in the north's trade balance, matched, in the balance of payments, by a capital outflow to the south. This may create the optical illusion-misleading even to nonorthodox economists-that foreign saving in the north has generated investment in the south. It is enough to think of the globe as a closed economy and the same Keynesian causality, if valid in a single country, will necessarily apply to the world as well (cf., Dalziel and Harcourt, 1997; Cesaratto 2005A, ch. 6 ). 
Final remarks
In this paper we have traced the foundations of the mainstream view of an FF scheme in marginalist capital theory. According to this theory, capital consists of a fund of consumption goods through which consumption can be postponed. In particular, a rise in 'foresight' saving is matched by investment devoted to increase per capita capital endowment. In the case of a fertility shock, the accumulated capital could be either absorbed by a further increase in the capital-labour ratio or reconverted into consumption goods. We envisage three obstacles to an FF reform.
To begin with, the reform may fail, at least to a substantial degree, to raise the marginal propensity to save, even in economies in which there is no mandatory pension scheme in operation, since the mandatory old-age saving may substitute for similarly motivated voluntary saving.
Second, reforms that rely on public debt to finance the transition from PAYG to FF schemes are doomed to fail, since the higher private saving is compensated by lower government saving. Although this is well known, these reforms are still proposed both by individual scholars and by international organisations as genuine shifts towards FF programmes. The World Bank itself acknowledges that the significance of privatising 1 Let us assume an economy characterised by the following data: marginal propensity to consume: c 0 ¼ 0.8; private investment: I ¼ 200; pension transfers: TR ¼ 100; contribution rate: a ¼ 0.1. The resulting equilibrium income is Y ¼ 1,000, consistent with the financial equilibrium of PAYG. Suppose that, as an effect of an FF reform, the marginal propensity to consume becomes c 1 ¼ 0.7. The new equilibrium level of income will be 729.73. Contributions are now 72.97, so that PAYG has a financial deficit of 27.03, which is financed out of private saving (partly voluntary and partly mandatory). The latter, given by the equation S ¼ sðY ÿ aY þ TRÞ, is equal to 227.03, which is enough to finance private investment (200) and the PAYG deficit (27.03).
2 In terms of the well-known national account identity S ÿ I ¼ ð G ÿ T Þ þ ðX ÿ MÞ, the neoclassical economists would argue that a rise in S in the North, given I, causes a rise in investment in the South followed by a rise in domestic X from the North. According to Keynesian economists, a rise in the propensity to save in the North, given domestic I, causes a fall in national income accompanied by a fall in M (incidentally, this produces a fall in income also in the South). The North's foreign saving has increased, and so perhaps PFs are created, but at the cost of a lower national income. This is shown by this simple example: with c 0 ¼ 0.8, m ¼ 0.2, E ¼ 200, output is Y ¼ 500, and S ¼ X ÿ M ¼ 100. If c 1 ¼ 0.7, we get Y ¼ 400 and S ¼ X ÿ M ¼ 120.
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PAYG lies in the social apprehension it may generate about its sustainability, creating a climate more favourable to its dismantling. Third, the attempt to increase the average community propensity to save by imposing extra contributions on workers in favour of an FF scheme will have deflationary effects. Other commentators on pension reforms have pointed out the importance of the criticism of the neoclassical causal relation between saving and investment (e.g., Barr, 2000, p. 13; Schultz, 2002, p. 87; Niggle, 2000, p. 802) .
1 In this paper we have reinforced this criticism by referring to the capital theory critique, whose importance should not be underestimated, since it is based on an analytical and never refuted logical flaw in neoclassical theory. The criticism of the neoclassical view of the saving-investment relation, both in closed and open economies, is the ultimate challenge to the conventional view of capitalisation reform. So, not only is it difficult for policy-makers to raise the propensity to save, but even if successful, the effects on investment will be nil and the reform prove abortive.
2 After the capital theory controversy this cannot be dismissed as 'vulgar Keynesianism'.
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